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Abstract
The  workforce  of  today  is  much  more  diverse  than  in  the  past,  where  women  are  now  an
essential part of the working population. They aspire high positions and equal compensation.
Gender equality in the workplace is directly linked to improved firm performance in various
fields.  Still,  gender  equality  is  not  achieved  in  American  companies.  It  is  assumed  that  the
reasons are tied to the top-level executives governing firms. Drawing from the upper echelons
theory,  this  paper  examines  whether  the  likelihood  of  a  firm  to  take  an  action  in  favour  of
gender equality can be explained by the personal values and beliefs of CEOs, which in turn are
driven  by  their  age,  gender,  and  political  ideology.  The  dataset  includes  the  CEOs  of  all
companies listed in the S&P500 between the years of 2009 and 2016. Results show, that there is
no statistical significance between CEO characteristics and advocacy for gender equality in the
workplace. Future research could be further directed towards the characteristics of individuals
in TMT in general to gather more insights of how much gender equality is influenced by the
individual characteristics, beliefs and values of the individuals at the top.
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Abstrato
A força de trabalho de hoje é muito mais diversa do que no passado, onde as mulheres são agora
uma parte essencial da população trabalhadora. Eles aspiram a posições altas e remuneração
igual.  A  igualdade  de  gênero  no  local  de  trabalho  está  diretamente  ligada  à  melhoria  do
desempenho  da  empresa  em  vários  campos.  Ainda  assim,  a  igualdade  de  gênero  não  é
alcançada  nas  empresas  americanas.  Supõe-se  que  os  motivos  estejam  relacionados  aos
executivos de alto nível que governam as empresas. Partindo da teoria dos escalões superiores,
este artigo examina se a probabilidade de uma empresa tomar uma ação em favor da igualdade
de gênero pode ser explicada pelos valores e crenças pessoais dos CEOs, que por sua vez são
motivados por idade, gênero e política. ideologia. O conjunto de dados inclui os CEOs de todas
as empresas listadas na S & P500 entre os anos de 2009 e 2016. Os resultados mostram que não
há significância estatística entre as características dos CEOs  e a defesa da igualdade de gênero
no  local  de  trabalho.  Pesquisas  futuras  podem  ser  direcionadas  para  as  características
psicológicas dos indivíduos na TMT em geral, a fim de reunir mais insights sobre quanto os
resultados  organizacionais  são  influenciados  pelas  características  demográficas,  crenças  e
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Since  its  first  publication  in  2006  the  Global  Gender  Gap  Report,  published  by  the  World
Economic  Forum  (WEF),  has  measured  the  existing  gap  between  the  male  and  female
population  of  153  countries  in  the  four  dimensions  of  economic  empowerment,  political
participation, access to education and health services. In its latest report of 2020, the WEF has
found that the world in total is progressing towards gender equality, but that it would still take
99.7 years on a global average to close the existing gaps fully. This measurement considers the
time  it  would  take  to  close  the  gap  with  the  current  levels  of  advancement  on  the  four
dimensions.  On  a  regional  level,  however,  there  are  significant  differences.  While  Western
Europe would take 54 years to reach full gender parity at the current speed, the other world
regions are ranking behind by huge differences. 
Of the eight world regions, the North American area ranks seventh, where the WEF concludes
that it would take 154 more years at the current advancement until gender parity is achieved.
Especially  in  the  United  States,  the  WEF  has  identified  a  stall  in  progress  towards  gender
equality (World Economic Forum, 2020). Due to its lack of progress, the country has fallen to a
global rank of 53, down three positions compared to 2019, out of 153 countries.  In the first
report  published  in  2006,  the  United  States  was  ranked  23rd,  since  then  it  has  fallen  to  its
current rank. The reasons for this, analysed by the WEF, have mainly been in the dimension of
Economic Participation and Opportunity. Where the United States has virtually achieved parity
in two dimensions, Education attainment and Health, the progress towards gender equality has
retracted  in  the  dimension  of  Economic  Participation  and  Opportunity.  In  2006  the  United
States  ranked  third  globally  in  this  dimension,  whereas  its  current  rank  is  26.  The  primary
sources of this retraction are due to retractions in equal wages and income gaps remaining large
between men and women. The WEF has identified that the financial disparities are the main
reasons  for  gender  inequality  in  the  workplace,  the  other  issues,  although  slightly  better
developed, are labour force participation and presence in senior roles. Two-thirds of the adult
female population have an occupation and represent 41% of the middle and high management
roles. But at the top of the ladder women are only occupying one-fifth of corporate managing
boards.
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The WEF has identified four key areas to reach full gender equality in the workplace. The first
action is to increase female participation in the labour market broadly and in selected sectors
dominated  by  men,  such  as  construction  and  energy.  Secondly,  the  number  of  women  in
leadership roles has to be increased. Thirdly, the gaps in wages, remuneration and incomes have
to be closed. And lastly, parity has to be reached in emerging high-demand skills and jobs.
With that current status in mind, what could be the drivers of gender equality in the workplace
in the United States? This paper intends to look at the individuals at the top of organisations,
assuming  that  they  may  increase  the  likelihood  of  advocacy  of  gender  equality  in  the
workplace.
In the first part, this paper provides an overview of gender inequality in the United States, a
definition of gender equality in the workplace. It uses literature on the topic of CSR to classify
gender equality as an integral part of CSR strategies. Then, this paper discusses the concepts of
the upper echelons theory to build a theoretical foundation for the purpose of this paper. Along
with the theoretical framework comes a definition of concepts like the conservatism-liberalism
axis  and CEO ideology.  After  that,  three hypotheses are formulated.  The hypotheses aim to
support the theory introduced and to raise questions of interest for this paper.
In the second part,  the methodical part,  this paper discusses the methods undertaken to give
relevant answers to the questions raised in the first part. First, a data sample had to be collected;
then independent variables had to be defined to answer the hypotheses. This part presents how
the variables were defined and how the data for the variables were collected. Additionally, this
part  of  the  paper  presents  the  control  variables  used  for  this  research.  At  the  end  of  the
methodical part, the used statistical model will be given.
The third part of this paper presents the results of the research, along with an interpretation of
the outcomes.
In  the  final  part,  the  paper  summarises  the  main  conclusions  drawn,  discussing  constraints
faced in the research process. The paper will also suggest to expand its research and offer an
explanation on the academic and practical implications from its findings.
7
2. Theory
2.1. Gender equality in the workplace
In the academic world,  there has been a lot  of  research on gender equality at  work.  Gender
equality in the workplace can be defined as a state when people can access and achieve the same
rewards,  resources  and  opportunities  in  their  workplace  regardless  of  their  gender.   On  an
organizational  level,  individuals  compete  for  authority,  income  and  prestige.  Still,  the
distribution of these items of desire is unequally allocated between men and women, even if the
occupational  level  seems  to  be  the  same  (Britton  &  Williams,  2000).  There  is  a  variety  of
reasons proposed by researches explaining gender inequality in the workplace, such as cultural
beliefs, employer’s actions or employees’ preferences (Charles, Reskin, & Padavic, 1996). 
Gender inequality is broadly regarded as unethical, because it deprives employees the possible
rewards  of  a  career,  such  as  high  income,  position  or  power,  based  on  their  gender,  thus
violating their  rights guaranteed by legal  bodies (Ngo, Foley,  Wong, & Loi,  2003).  Women
have substantially contributed to the labour force over the last decades, and the income gap has
been significantly reduced compared to their male counterparts (Blau & Kahn, 2008). Although
improvements were made, the gap is still very existent. Where the income gap has almost been
closed at the lower levels of organizations, it remains large at the top of the wage distribution,
indicating that women at top-level positions are considerably earning less than men in similar
jobs (Blau & Kahn, 2017). 
Another aspect of gender inequality are differences in occupations, a term called occupational
segregation, meaning that historically speaking women and men are concentrated in different
kind  of  jobs.  Predominantly  female  professions  include  teaching,  nursing  or  administrative
positions, while most male professions include managerial roles, engineering or medicine. Over
the decades, women have decreased their presence in historically female occupations and made
significant advancements into managerial and other predominantly male professions (Blau &
Kahn, 2017). Blau and Kahn (2017) also suggest that professional segregation is still one of the
main reasons for inequality in the workplace. 
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Additionally, to the segregation across professions, there is also the segregation within firms
because men and women tend to be employed at different levels of the hierarchy than men.
Across  Fortune  500  companies,  women  make  up  roughly  half  of  the  mid-level  managerial
roles, on the executive level, they make up 14.3 per cent and hold 3.8 per cent of CEO positions.
The reasons suggested by scholars trying to explain the scarcity of women at the top are diverse.
One reason may be that women are still newcomers to those positions and that it takes time to
move up through the ranks, while other explanations suggest that there are hidden barriers to
career  advancement,  the  so-called  glass-ceiling  (Blau  &  Kahn,  2017).  There  seems  to  be
evidence  that  there  are  inequalities  when  it  comes  to  promotions,  where  men  are  favoured
above  female  candidates  and  are  more  likely  to  receive  promotions  even  if  the  level  of
qualification is  the same (Addison,  Ozturk,  & Wang, 2014).  Studies have shown that  in the
corporate world, the higher representation of women in the top is positively correlated to higher
wages and representation of women at the lower and middle levels. Research suggesting that
there  may  be  discrimination  and  that  it  reduces  once  women  are  promoted  to  top  positions
(Bell, 2005; Shin, 2012). 
Overall  it  can  be  summarized  that  there  are  inequalities  between  men  and  women  in  the
workplace and that they can be measured, whether in remuneration or representation. How can
then an environment be described where there is no discrimination based on gender? According
to  the  Workplace  Gender  Equality  Agency  (WGEA)  of  the  Australian  government,  gender
equality  is  reflected  in  three  broad  areas  of  the  workplace  environment.  First,  in  terms  of
remuneration, companies have to ensure that they provide equal pay for work of equal value or
comparable value. Actions should therefore reduce the wage gaps identified by researchers and
becoming more egalitarian. Second, companies have to remove all barriers to the full and equal
participation of women throughout the workforce. In praxis, this would mean that firms need to
ensure equal opportunities among their workforce and to empower women into predominantly
male positions actively. Third, companies have to make sure that all different types of roles,
occupations  and  industries  are  accessible  for  women.  Firms  should  increase  their  efforts  to
promote women to the higher levels of the hierarchy and make their top management teams
more diverse.
2.2. Gender equality in the workplace as a form of CSR
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To further assess the actions described above, it is useful to assign them to a field of activity in
the  business  context.  This  paper  suggests  that  given  their  many  stakeholders  involved  and
implications beyond the firm level, actions in favour of gender equality could be classified as
part of a firm’s broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. 
Within the literature, there is no definitive definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),
in part, because there is no common understanding of the term. Every individual and society has
different measures of CSR. Also, in a global economy, there are so many different standards
and regulations, that result in different regional definitions exist (Sheehy, 2014). Nonetheless,
the European Commission (EC) provides a practical explanation of CSR that is useful for this
study’s purpose. Specifically, the EC defines CSR as the voluntary engagement of companies
in  activities  that  contribute  to  a  better  society  and  the  reduction  of  environmental  harm
(European Commission,  2001).  Overall,  CSR means considering societal  and environmental
concerns in business operations and interactions with stakeholders. 
Furthermore,  CSR is  further  divided  by  the  EC into  an  external  and  an  internal  dimension.
Outside of the company, CSR extends into local communities and involves more stakeholders
than  employees  and  shareholders.  There  are  suppliers,  business  partners,  public  authorities,
NGOs and many more which can be taken into consideration. There are three elements in the
external  dimension  of  CSR.  First,  CSR  is  about  the  integration  of  companies  in  their  local
setting,  everywhere  a  company  might  be  present,  whether  it  be  domestically  or  globally.
Interactions with the local community are meaningful because they provide the company with a
supply  of  workforce,  infrastructure  and  frameworks  of  regulations.  The  second  element  of
external  CSR  is  about  business  partners,  suppliers  and  consumers.  In  the  initiatives  taken,
companies  should  also  incorporate  those  stakeholders.  CSR  may  be  expressed  by  selecting
suppliers who meet specific requirements regarding social and environmental issues. Thirdly,
the element of human rights is also included by the EC as part of the external dimension of
CSR.  Because  this  field  is  very  complex,  where  discussions  about  ethical,  legal  and  moral
dilemmas are abundant, companies face challenging questions. One of the main problems is to
draw a line where a company’s responsibility ends and the public’s starts.
Within a  company,  the EC has also defined three elements  of  CSR. The internal  dimension
refers to human resource management, occupational health and safety and adaption to change.
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The  first  element  is  about  guaranteeing  equality  in  recruitment,  in  terms  of  promotion,  in
training and education of the workforce, in remuneration and the work-life balance within a
company.  All  anti-discriminatory  efforts  can  be  found  in  the  field  of  human  resource
management of a company’s internal CSR. The second inner CSR element, health and safety at
work, is about providing the workforce with an environment in which they can be safe from
physical or psychological danger and thus keep the workforce in a good state of health. Thirdly,
the  element  of  adaption  to  change  is  about  the  efforts  a  company  makes  to  take  into
consideration  the  impacts  of  mergers  and acquisitions,  restructuring,  cultural  transformation
and other aspects.
As a conclusion, it can be said that gender equality in the workplace is essentially a part of the
internal  dimension  of  CSR.  All  three  elements  of  internal  CSR are  part  of  initiatives  that  a
company can pursue to promote gender equality within its workforce. Some researchers have
even gotten so far to introduce the concept of Gendered Social Responsibility (GSR) (Velasco,
Larrieta, Intxaurburu, De Bobadilla, & Del Mar Alonso-Almeida, 2014). They define GSR as
the incorporation of gender equality objectives into all different social responsibility initiatives
implemented by an organization.
The decision of how much a company invests in CSR, including in gender equality initiatives,
is usually not regulated by public regimes but is instead an internal decision where the company
sets goals for itself (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Is the motivation of investing in CSR a purely
altruistic  matter  because  honourable  people  are  in  charge  or  is  there  more  to  it?  There  are
different  explanations  suggested  by  scholars  trying  to  explain  a  company’s  motives  when
engaging  in  CSR.  One  motive  is  financial,  where  the  decision  is  based  on  a  firm’s  future
financial performance. Studies have shown that firms contributing to CSR gain an increase in
financial  profitability,  because  they  may  attract  more  customers  thanks  to  their  efforts
(Graafland,  2004).  Besides  the  financial  motive,  other  reasons  of  contributing  to  CSR  may
derive from a firm’s own culture and commitment to certain principles such as moral duties
which are unique to every company (Graafland & van de Ven, 2014).  Although the goal of
contributing to CSR may vary among firms, the baseline motivation seems to be self-interest,
regardless  of  altruistic  intentions  (Moon,  2001).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  whether
contributing to CSR towards internal or external stakeholders is originating from self-interest
alone and not instead from authentic altruism (Rollinsson, 2002).
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In  terms  of  outcomes,  research  has  shown  that  CSR  initiatives  increase  a  firm’s  reputation
(Brammer  &  Pavelin,  2006).  This  increase  in  reputation  has  been  shown  to  be  gratified  by
customers, who then respond in a more positive evaluation of a company and its services or
products  (Arora  &  Henderson,  2007).  Also,  it  has  been  shown  to  transform  into  increased
customer  loyalty  (Maignan,  Ferrell,  &  Hult,  1999).  This  means  that  engaging  in  CSR  is
generally a good thing to do for every company, as an increase in reputation will likely mean
more  money  from  customers.  A  better  reputation  will  also  have  a  positive  outcome  in  the
internal  levels  of  an  organization  (Aguinis  &  Glavas,  2012).  Because  CSR  in  general  and
gender equality as a part of it, it is very likely that engaging in gender equality will increase the
reputation of a company, bringing along the benefits mentioned above.
So why are not all  companies promoting gender equality? Below, I draw on upper echelons
theory to argue that the personal values and preferences of CEOs can sometimes bias their CSR
decision-making and hinder them from advocating for gender equality.     
2.3. Upper Echelons Theory
Donald  C.  Hambrick  first  introduced  upper  echelons  theory  in  1984.  The  theory’s  main
objective is to provide an answer to the question of why organizations act as they do, which is
vital  for  every  organizational  theorist.  While  there  are  many  other  theories  available  on
organizational  decision  making,  the  approach proposed by Hambrick  focuses  on  the  role  of
CEOs and top management teams (TMT) within their organizations. Before the introduction of
the  upper  echelons  theory,  scholars  mainly  focused  on  techno-economic  factors  such  as
competitiveness within markets or changing demands from consumers (Hambrick, MacMillan,
& Day,  1982;  Porter,  1980).  Also,  other  ways to research the strategic process have mainly
focussed on the flows of information and decisions, disregarding the people involved and their
backgrounds.
Hambrick’s theory offered a novel approach in macro-organizational research: an emphasis on
the dominant people of an individual organization—namely, the top managers guiding multi-
billion-dollar businesses (Hambrick, 2007).  Within this theoretical approach, organizational
outcomes are viewed as the reflections of the values and cognitive bases of influential people in
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the  organization  (Hambrick  &  Mason,  1984).  Specifically,  Hambrick  (1984)  proposes  that
executives’  characteristics  serve  to  filter  and  distort  information  in  a  three-step  process:
executives’ experiences, values, and personalities affect their (1) field of vision (the directions
they look and listen), (2) selective perception (what they see and hear), and (3) interpretation
(how they attach meaning to what they see and hear). 
Despite the promising potential of upper echelons theory, “black-box” psychological and social
processes  by  which  top-level  decisionmakers  make  their  choices  remain  a  mystery.  This  is
important because the aim is to improve the insights provided to executives concerning how
they might overcome the biases associated with their unique set of beliefs and dispositions. The
reason  why  this  has  not  been  well  researched  until  date  is  that  there  are  relatively  few
researchers  who  have  an  interest  in  and  facility  with  both  micro-processes  and  macro-
organizational  phenomena  (Hambrick,  2007).  As  a  result,  the  psychological  and  social
processes  by  which  executive  profiles  are  converted  into  strategic  choices  remain  largely  a
mystery—the proverbial black box (Hambrick, 2007). 
Nonetheless,  some  researches  have  still  tried  to  take  a  look  into  this  black  box,  and  have
succeeded  to  find  evidence  that  the  demographical  and  other  personal  values  of  top-level
executives  are  positively  related  to  organizational  outcomes  (Boeker,  1997).  For  example,
studies have shown that older CEOs tend to follow more cautious strategies (Child, 1974), as
well as lower spending in a company’s R&D (Barker & Mueller, 2002) or lower likelihood of
adopting new technology (Kitchell, 2009). Another characteristic of CEOs which has shown to
influence  a  company’s  performance  is  linked  to  their  region  or  country  of  origin.  Research
conducted  on  a  cross-regional  and  cross-country  level  suggests  that  firm  performance  is
affected through national institutions such as political, education and cultural systems in which
a  CEO  is  socialized  (Ioannou  &  Serafeim,  2012).  The  findings  showcase  a  link  between  a
company’s sustainability performance and the country of origin of a CEO but do not explain
overall firm performance (Garcia-Blandon, Argilés-Bosch, & Ravenda, 2019).
Some scholars have additionally used upper echelon theory to predict the propensity of firms to
engage in CSR, as well as the type of CSR they choose. For example, there is evidence that
there is an effect of individual personal values as factors explaining the adoption of CSR in
companies  (Hemingway  &  Maclagan,  2004).  Studies  have  found  indications  that  a  CEO's
13
political beliefs are manifested in the profiles of their firms’ CSR, showcasing that more liberal
CEOs have  a  positive  influence  on  the  advancements  in  CSR (Chin,  Hambrick,  & Treviño,
2013).  Another  indication  of  the  characteristic  of  a  CEO  influencing  CSR  is  the  level  of
narcissism, which suggests that the more a CEO craves for attention, the more it is likely that
their firms contribute to CSR (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016). It seems that individual
managers are using their influence to initiate or change specific topics, thus addressing their
personal ethical and moral concerns. There are also examples of managers who champion CSR,
instead  of  just  acting  as  agents  of  corporate  policies  (Hemingway  & Maclagan,  2004).  The
assumption can be made that the characteristics and values of individuals are having an impact
on CSR strategies of companies.
Drawing from the various examples of possible influences of a CEOs’ characteristics to firm
CSR, it may be possible that some characteristics may also affect the likelihood of advocacy in
favour of gender equality as a part of an overall CSR strategy. As previous literature has mainly
focused on a firm’s CSR strategy as a whole, this study concentrates on a particular element of
CSR, namely gender equality in the workplace.
2.4. CEO Characteristics and gender equality
2.4.1. CEO age 
In the world of business, CEOs must continuously adapt their businesses to gain competitive
advantages  over  their  competitors.  While  changes  in  terms  of  acquisitions,  investments  in
R&D, equipment and other sorts are almost always expected from top-level managers, there
seems to be evidence that  long-lasting CEOs,  and therefore ageing CEOs,  are less  active in
changing their firms (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).
A reason why older people in the working population might resist to change may come from a
social  perspective.  In  the  transition  from  young  adulthood  to  the  middle  stages  of  life,
individuals usually undergo a profound change in their lives. They found families, take up more
responsibilities in their personal and professional lives and so on (Glenn, 1974). CEOs of ten
years ago have been socialized in a completely different world of business (Toossi & Morisi,
2017).  When they started working,  the  presence of  women in  the workforce was much less
when compared to today’s workforce population, where women are a completely normal part
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of it (Peake & Harris, 2002). Scholars have suggested that top management individuals may
become more change-resisting and have difficulties to accept new modern ideas and acquire
new behaviours with increasing age (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). There have also been empirical
studies finding that older managers may follow less change-oriented strategies (Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992). Those arguments can be implemented in the mechanisms of the upper echelons
theory,  where  vision,  perception and interpretation are  the  steps  a  manager  has  to  follow in
order to drive change.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with older CEOs are less likely to advocate for gender equality.
2.4.2. CEO gender and gender equality
In  the  past  literature,  gender  has  only  received  little  attention  from  scholars  in  the  upper
echelons  theory.  However,  there  is  plenty  of  research  on  this  field  in  psychology  and
organizational  behaviour  (Musteen,  Barker,  &  Baeten,  2006).  When  it  comes  to  gender
research,  literature  has  mainly  focussed  on  the  implications  of  increasing  representation  of
women in top positions.
Academic  sources  suggest  that  female  managers  may  differ  from  male  managers  in  their
approach and thinking toward changes in their organizations (Musteen et al., 2006). Research
has shown that female executives are more likely to be at ease with change and also have a
greater optimism than male executives (Mainiero,  1994).  Mainiero was able to find out that
when female managers climb the corporate ladder, they would have to show more initiative,
prove themselves harder in front of superiors and display an attitude to new problem-solving
abilities. There is also support by other scholars, who suggest that women are more likely to
adapt to change and identify strongly with change situations in which they saw themselves as
leading (Paton & Dempster, 2002). It can be suggested that there are differences between male
and  female  regarding  their  attitudes  towards  change  and  that  this  may  have  an  effect  of  a
company’s CSR strategy. As already mentioned above, there may be a link between women in
top  positions  and  benefits  for  women  in  the  lower  ranks  in  terms  of  promotions  and  better
wages  (Bell,  2005;  Shin,  2012).  According  to  the  mechanisms  of  vision,  perception  and
interpretation, the following hypothesis is formulated:
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Hypothesis 2: Firms with female CEOs are more likely to advocate for gender equality.
2.4.3. CEO ideology and gender equality
Defined as a  ‘‘set  of  beliefs  about  the proper order of  society and how it  can be achieved’’
(Erikson & Tedin, 2019), political ideology represents deeply held preferences and goals that
individuals are driven to pursue through the course of their lives. In general, it can be said that
political  ideologies  are  potent  motivators  for  people’s  actions  (Jost  &  Amodio,  2012).  The
motivator of ideology is so strong that it even can explain why people do what they do (Jost,
2006). Furthermore, the more influential individuals get, for example by occupying positions
with  a  high  degree  of  influence,  the  more  they  are  seeking  to  promote  their  ideologies  into
actions made by their firms (Chin et al., 2013). 
Political ideologies have conventionally been captured through a conservatism-liberalism axis.
This axis is seen to cover the most meaningful differences in how individuals perceive ideal
goals  for  society  and  the  optimal  way  to  achieve  them  (Jost,  2006).  There  are  two  main
differences between liberals and conservatives: (1) attitudes towards social inequality and (2)
attitudes towards social change as a conflict to tradition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,
2003).  Conservatives believe that people are essentially unequal and that as a consequence,
rewards  and  punishments  should  be  unequal  (Rivière,  1989).  On the  other  side,  liberals  are
more  egalitarian,  believing  that  all  individuals  should  be  treated  the  same  way,  socially,
politically and economically (Rivière, 1989). If an individual is more liberal or conservative is a
highly  personal  value;  therefore,  CEOs  carry  their  beliefs  with  them  regardless  of  their
environment  or  occupation.  The  allegiance  to  an  ideology  is  immune  to  an  individual’s
position, type of occupation and social setting (Fremeth, Richter, & Schaufele, 2013). Research
has also brought evidence that ideological allegiances among CEOs are meaningful predictors
of strategic outcomes and actions made by firms (Chin et al., 2013). 
Because conservative individuals believe in inequality and its importance for society, the paper
suggests  that  firms  headed by  conservative  CEOs are  less  likely  to  take  action  in  favour  of
gender equality. Also, it is expected that liberal-leaning CEOs see their firms, not as a vehicle
for shareholder value, but instead, see its function much broader. They think that their firms
should have a generally positive effect on society (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014).
It is assumed that there is a link between CSR and the set of beliefs of their TMT. Following the
mechanisms of vision, perception and interpretation, the following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 3: Firms with more liberal CEOs are more likely to advocate for gender
equality.
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3. Methodology and Data Collection
3.1. Sample
The sample of observed companies consists of all companies listed in the S&P 500 at any point
in time during the period between 2009 and 2016. This amounted to 502 distinct firms. The
dependent variable was measured in each year (t) between 2009 and 2016 for every company.
After  excluding  observations  due  to  missing  data,  a  final  sample  of  2.995  firm-year
observations covering 502 distinct companies, was retained.
3.2. Dependent Variable
3.2.1. Action Taken
To measure  if  a  company had taken action in  a  specific  year  in  terms of  gender  equality,  a
search was conducted on LexisNexis, a repository of full-text articles in international journals,
magazines, news publications and economic services. LexisNexis includes around 36.000 data
sources.  Within  the  platform,  a  search  across  five  major  global  news  publications  was
conducted. The news publications included:  The Financial Times (London), LA Times (Los
Angeles), Wall Street Journal (New York), Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) and The New
York Times (New York). The search terms were: “gender equality”, “wage gap” and “glass
ceiling”.  For  each  company  within  the  sample,  a  search  including  the  keywords  mentioned
above across the above-declared news publications was conducted, covering the years between
and including 2009 and 2016. 
For the 502 observed companies, a total of 1905 articles were recorded, including the search
mentioned above keywords. From those articles,  80 were found relevant for this thesis.  The
articles recorded a total of 66 actions made in favour of gender equality. Examples of actions
made  were  addressing  promotions  of  women  to  high-level  executive  jobs,  where  they  are
underrepresented. Other examples were pointed at promotions of female managers to the level
of directors, thus making the talent pool for top positions more diverse. Also, equality of pay
was  an  issue  addressed  by  companies  which  took  action  in  favour  of  gender  equality.  The
dependent variable was coded as a dichotomous value, where 0 means that no action was taken
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by a firm in a given year and 1 means that an action was made. The sample contains 2.929
(97,8%) outcomes of 0 and 66 outcomes of 1 (2,2%).
3.3. Independent Variables
To assess the three hypothesises defined above, three independent variables were included in
the model of the thesis. The variables included (1) age of CEO, (2) gender of CEO and (3) CEO
ideology. 577 CEOs were counted for the 502 observed companies between 2009 and 2016; the
names  were  retrieved  by  manual  searches  through  publicly  available  information  such  as
financial year reports. On average, every company had 1.15 CEOs in eight years. The average
duration of a CEO tenure was 6,9 years during the observed time.
3.3.1. CEO Age
CEO age was calculated by deriving each CEO’s year of birth through online searches since
access to services like Capital IQ or other databases were not available to the author. The age of
the CEOs in the observed time frame ranges from 33 years to 79 years. The average age of a
CEO in the sample is 53,4 years.
Figure 1: Age distribution of CEOs in dataset
3.3.2. CEO Gender
The second independent variable is the gender of the CEOs. From the valid sample of 2.995
observations, a total of 2.805 was male, while 190 observations (6,8%) were female. The data
was recorded as a binary value of 0 or 1. Because it is expected that female CEOs positively
affect their firm to take a stand in favour of gender equality, female CEOs were recorded with
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the value of 1. Accordingly, male CEOs were assigned a value of 0. 
3.3.3. CEO Ideology
In line  with  prior  studies,  CEO political  ideology was measured as  a  validated index of  the
contributions made to the two major parties in the United States  (The Democratic National
Congress  and  the  Republican  Party),  where  donations  to  the  Democrats  is  an  indicator  for
liberal ideology and contributions to the Republicans as an indicator for conservative ideology
(Chin et al., 2013). In political research, it has been long established that the identification to a
party represents a very stable indicator of where an individual stands on the liberal-conservative
ideology  axis  (Goren,  Federico,  &  Kittilson,  2009).  Because  every  individual  political
contribution above $200 is recorded by the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC) and made
public, this data is openly available on a database called opensecrets.org. The contribution may
be in favour of candidates, political action committees or other political entities associated with
one of the two parties aforementioned. The individual CEOs had to be correctly identified in the
database to collect correct data. 
The data was sampled as follows: To get a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a very high
of political conservatism and a value of 1 indicates a very high degree of political liberalism.
The formula to compute the values is:
If no donation was recorded a value of 0,5 for CEO ideology would be the output, indicating
that the CEO was neither identified as liberal-leaning (>0,5) or conservative-leaning (<0,5). To
be  more  precise  and  to  acknowledge  possible  changes  in  political  beliefs  (although  not
expected) the donations were summed until the year 2009 and then added year per year to make
variations visible.  According to  the best  practices  suggested by other  researchers,  a  lag was
implemented  in  the  dataset  to  show  that  a  contribution  made  in  a  year  would  affect  the
consecutive year and not the same year (Hambrick, 2007).  For example, a CEO who held a
position from the years of 2000-2012, the donations from 2000 to 2008 were summed up and
recorded as the focal point in 2009. The value of contributions for the consecutive year was then
added. In this example, all donations during the year of 2009 were added to the contributions
before and entered as value for the year 2010 (see Table 1 below).
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Table 1: Example of a CEO holding office from 2000-2012
Year Donation to Republicans Donation to Democrats
2009 Sum of years 2000-2008 Sum of years 2000-2008
2010 Above amount + donations 
made in 2009
Above amount + donations 
made in 2009
2011 Above amount + donations 
made in 2010
Above amount + donations 
made in 2010
2012 (final year) Above amount + donations 
made in 2011
Above amount + donations 
made in 2011
A primary constraint in the data collection process is the clear identification of CEOs in the
FEC  database.  Only  records  were  accepted  where  an  exact  match  could  be  identified.  This
identification was achieved by matching the actual name of a CEO with the firm’s name he was
heading at that point of time. Records with the name of a CEO but another firm name were
disregarded because of possible uncertainty of correct data gathering.
It is visible (see Figure 3) that from all valid observations, the majority of observations gathered
around a value of 0,5. It is also visual that there are considerably more conservative-leaning
CEOs than liberal-leaning CEOs. The recorded average on the liberal-conservative axis is 0,4.
This shows that the average CEO of an S&P 500 firm in the time between 2009 and 2016 is
conservative-leaning.
Figure 3: CEO ideology distribution
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3.4. Control Variables
To rule out alternative explanations on the gender equality outcome, other variables on the firm,
industry and institutional level were controlled for.
3.4.1. Firm Size
Firm size was recorded as a sum of total assets. To even out the vast differences in size across
the individual firms, the natural logarithm of the total assets was calculated. Assuming that the
size of a firm in a specific year would affect the consecutive year, a lag was implemented.
3.4.2. Firm Performance
Another control in terms of firm performance was included, since the better a firm performs, the
likelier it is that it can afford to take actions towards organizational changes in general. Firm
performance  was  measured  as  a  return  on  assets.  Also,  a  lag  was  implemented  in  order  to
account for the assumption that the performance of a specific year would affect the consecutive
year.
3.4.3. Slack Resources Measured
The third firm-level control accounted for is slack resources.  The debt a firm has loaded on
itself  is  another  determinant  of  the  firm’s  ability  to  afford  organizational  changes  and
transformation. A common way to control for slack resources is to use a firm’s debt equity ratio
(Chin et al., 2013).
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3.4.4. Control for industry
On the industry-level, a control for specific industries was implemented using a two-digit GICS
-code.  The  two-digit  code  allows  for  a  broader  industry  comparison  and  facilitates  a
comparison among industries.
3.4.5. Headquarter State Liberalism
In order to isolate the effects of CEO political ideology, beyond that of the prevailing ideology
in  the  local  geographic  environment,  an  environment  control  variable  for  headquarter  state
liberalism was created. A value of 0 or 1 was assigned to this variable. If the majority of voters
in the last election cycle voted for the Republican candidate, a value of 0 was recorded. If the
majority  of  votes  were  given  to  the  Democratic  candidate,  a  value  of  1  was  recorded.  This
would control for a broader environment that there is also an effect of the location of a firm on
its organizational outcomes.
3.5. Estimation Methods
Three  generalized  linear  models  were  used  to  estimate  the  likelihood  of  outcomes.  As  the
outcome of the formulas is either 0 or 1, a binomial family was chosen, with a probit link. A
random-effects estimation was used to account for the heterogeneity of each firm. To check if a
fixed-effect model would not represent better results, a Hausman-test was conducted between a
fixed-effects (within-model) and a random-effects (random-model) model. The Hausman-test
was not significant, meaning that the model assuming the random effects as fixed effects is not
significantly different, thus retaining the null hypothesis and accepting the random-model.  The
computations were made in the R statistical program.
4. Results
Descriptive  statistics  and  the  correlation  matrix  are  presented  in  table  1  and  2.  The  model
coefficients are shown in table 3 for the three hypotheses. The coefficients are an indicator of
the  likelihood  of  the  outcome  y=1.  An  increase  in  a  hypothetical  variable  x  increases  or
decreases the probability that y=1, meaning that the outcome is more or less likely. In other
words, if x increases the effect, y=1 becomes more likely. But if x decreases, the outcome y=1
becomes less likely. 
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While the coefficients can indicate a change in the likelihood of y=1, they can’t display the
magnitude. To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, it is common to use marginal effects.
The marginal effects reflect the change in probability of Y=1 given a one-unit change in an
independent variable x. The increase in x increases (decreases) the likelihood that y=1 by the
marginal  effect  as  a  per  cent  (Hosmer,  Lemeshow,  &  Sturdivant,  2013).  Additionally,  a
McFadden test indicates the amount explained by the model, where a high value is desired. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to report the statistical significance of the relationship between the
variables. Statistical significance means that the relationship between two or more variables is
caused by something other than chance. If the result of a dataset is statistically significant, the
null  hypothesis  can be rejected,  which hypothesizes that  there is  nothing more than random
chance  at  work  in  the  data.  A  data  set  provides  statistical  significance  when  the  p-value  is
sufficiently small.  When the p-value is  large,  then the results  in the data are explainable by
chance alone, and the data are deemed consistent with (while not proving) the null hypothesis.
When the p-value is sufficiently small (e.g., 5% or less), then the results are not easily explained
by chance alone, and the data are deemed inconsistent with the null hypothesis; in this case, the
null hypothesis of chance alone as an explanation of the data is rejected in favour of a more
systematic explanation (Fahrmeir, Pigeot, Künstler, & Tutz, 2010).
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Action made 2,995 0.022 0.147 0 0 0 1
CEO age 2,995 53.290 6.405 33 49 57 79
Female CEO 2,995 0.063 0.244 0 0 0 1
Liberal CEO 2,995 0.400 0.303 0.000 0.083 0.500 1.000
Firm size 2,995 4.313 0.598 3.064 3.875 4.682 6.410
Firm performance 2,995 0.134 0.087 -0.385 0.081 0.182 0.597
Slack resources 2,995 2.532 13.609 -342.040 0.983 3.314 187.458
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Industry control 2,995 5.503 2.607 1 3 8 11
HQ state liberalism 2,995 0.723 0.447 0 0 1 1






















Female CEO 0.054 -0.055
Liberal CEO 0.061 -0.116 0.186
Firm size 0.137 0.041 0.057 0.063
Firm performance -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 0.016 -0.398
Slack resources 0.015 0.017 0.0004 0.042 0.153 -0.104
Industry control 0.038 -0.058 0.011 0.146 0.160 -0.176 0.061
HQ state liberalism 0.042 -0.094 0.078 0.269 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.236




(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO age 0.006 0.007
(0.009) (0.009)
Female CEO 0.285 0.255
(0.177) (0.181)
Liberal CEO 0.240 0.190
(0.202) (0.206)
Firm size 0.756*** 0.749*** 0.748*** 0.741***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109)
Firm performance 0.548 0.682 0.621 0.676
(0.840) (0.850) (0.848) (0.857)
Slack resources -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HQ state liberalism 0.232 0.208 0.180 0.174
(0.155) (0.156) (0.162) (0.162)
Constant -9.899 -9.565 -9.549 -9.891
(96.384) (96.535) (97.810) (97.418)
Observations 2,995 2,995 2,995 2,995
Log Likelihood -271.369 -270.348 -270.855 -269.697
Akaike Inf. Crit. 574.739 572.696 573.711 575.394
Note: *p**p***p<0.01
Table 4: Probit model coefficients; Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors; Industry-
fixed effects are included in the model but not reported in the table.
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4.1. Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis  1  is  exploring  if  age  of  a  CEO is  negatively  related  to  a  firm’s  actions  towards
gender equality. From table 4, it can be seen that there is a positive relationship; if the age of a
CEO increases, the likelihood that an action for gender equality is made increases (β= 0.007).
This shows that the older a CEO of a specific firm is, it seems to be more likely that the firm will
take action for gender equality, thus contradicting the hypothesis proposed. The second element
to be answered, however, is whether the effect is statistically significant. As the p-value of the
coefficient is greater than 0.05, we can’t reject the null hypothesis, and thus hypothesis 1 is not
significant enough. Consequently, the data do not provide compelling evidence that the age of a
CEO is a statistically significant determinant of a firm’s propensity to take action in support of
gender equality. Hypothesis 1 is, thus, not accepted.
4.2. Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis is about a positive relationship between female CEOs and the likelihood
of their firm advocating for gender equality. In table 4, a positive coefficient can be identified,
in line with hypothesis 2 if a CEO of a firm in the dataset is a female, the likelihood of advocacy
in favour of gender equality increases (β= 0.255). However, the p-value is greater than 0.05,
indicating  that  the  effect  is  statistically  insignificant  and  that  the  null  hypothesis  cannot  be
rejected. In short, Hypothesis 2 is not accepted.
4.3. Hypothesis 3
The  third  hypothesis  predicts  that  CEO  liberalism  is  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of
advocacy in favour of gender equality. In table 4, a positive coefficient can be seen if there is an
increase in CEO liberalism, the likelihood of action in favour of gender equality increases (β=
0.190). The p-value of the independent variable of hypothesis 3 is greater than 0.05, however.
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and it can be concluded that the effect has no statistical
significance. Hypothesis 3 cannot be accepted.
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5. Conclusions and Future Research
The  questions  raised  by  the  paper  focussed  on  the  extent  to  which  managers  project  their
personal beliefs and values into their organizations through initiatives and strategic decisions.
This  was  done  by  linking  demographic  characteristics  of  CEOs to  the  CSR actions  of  their
firms. Gender equality in the workplace has been categorized as an integral part of the internal
dimension  of  CSR  strategies.  Also,  engaging  in  CSR  has  shown  to  be  beneficial  for  the
company,  increasing  reputation  towards  external  stakeholders,  like  consumers,  as  well  as
internal stakeholders, like employees. The importance of a good reputation is important for any
company and advocating gender equality within a company is likely to improve a company’s
standing among future employees, the public, media, consumers and other stakeholders. That
not all firms engage in gender equality advocacy, was therefore suggested to be the result of
CEOs’ values and preferences distorting their decision-making.  
As the null hypothesis has to be accepted for all the hypotheses made and fell short to rejecting
it, assumptions have to be made about the causes of those results. Failing to report significance
does still  not  mean that  the effects  of  this  study are  not  existent.  What  may be the possible
implications of failing to reject the null hypothesis for each variable?
(1) Does the age of a CEO really matter for gender equality advocacy?
As hypothesis 1 has been rejected due to a too high p-value, it can still not prove that age of a
CEO has no effect on advocacy towards gender equality. Since several other studies used CEO
age  as  an  independent  variable  in  their  studies,  this  hypothesis  can  be  improved  for  further
research. Age has been evident to be influential on a firm’s actions regarding CSR. One reason
may  be  the  small  sample  size  of  this  study,  comparable  studies  have  covered  a  far  greater
dataset, containing more than the 2.995 firm years of this paper. Another reason for failing to
reject the null hypothesis may be found in the very low variation of outcomes. Only 2% of the
sample dataset represented an action taken, which may seem too small of a size to prove the
hypothesis. Again, expanding the sample size, and also extending the keyword search to other
terms related to gender equality could provide more variation to the dataset. Another possibility
causing the failed rejection of the null hypothesis might lie in a structural weakness within the
dataset but is unlikely since this paper relied on peer-reviewed studies of similar build. The last
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possibility would be that the age of a CEO does not affect the advocacy of gender equality. This
might  be  possible  because  gender  equality  cannot  be  the  decision  of  a  single  person.  The
number of stakeholders and departments involved in a company might be too high.
(2) Does the gender of a CEO really matter for gender equality advocacy?
The second hypothesis has found there is a positive coefficient between a CEO being female
and advocacy of gender equality. But since this coefficient is not strong enough to reject the
null hypothesis, this study cannot find that this is significant to prove the hypothesis. This was
surprising because it has been shown by other researchers, that there are measurable differences
in how women influence a firm compared to men (Daily & Dalton, 2003). Again, three reasons
might be causing the rejection of this hypothesis. Firstly, the sample size may be too small to
detect  a  significant  effect.  Secondly,  the  variance  reported  is  too  tiny  to  find  compelling
evidence  proving  the  hypothesis.  Thirdly,  increasing  the  variance  through  more  keywords
might  return  a  greater  variance  of  outcomes,  even  if  the  time  frame  might  cover  the  same
amount  of  years.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  women represented  only  a  small  fraction of  the
CEOs  studied  might  implicate  a  too  small  variance  for  this  variable.  Another  possibility  of
explaining the failed support of the hypothesis might also lie in the design of the dataset. Again,
this seems unlikely because the dataset took peer-reviewed papers as inspiration. As the last
possibility, which would explain the rejection of the hypothesis would be the absence of effect
of a CEO’s gender on advocacy for gender equality. Just because men and women have been
studied to being different in a business context, and that women at the top might bring benefits
to the women at the lower levels of a company, it  does not have to mean that just by being
female  actions  have  to  follow  automatically.  Again,  there  are  so  many  more  stakeholders
involved that this might be out the influence of the CEO and that his or her gender may have no
effect on this matter.
(3) Does the political ideology of the CEO really matter for gender equality 
advocacy?
The rejection of the third hypothesis has also been surprising since the ideology of a CEO has
shown in previous studies to be reflected in a firm’s CSR actions (Chin et al., 2013). Accepting
the null hypothesis, in this case, does not mean that there is no relationship between a CEO’s
ideology and advocacy of gender equality. A significant effect could be found if the sample
would be expanded, thus containing more firm years. Additionally, the variance may have been
29
too small, increasing it by adding more keywords related to gender equality in the workplace
could return more variance of outcomes. The dataset might also be the cause of failing to reject
the null hypothesis, but since peer-reviewed studies influenced its design, this seems unlikely.
The last possibility would be that there is no influence of a CEOs ideology on the advocacy of
gender equality in the workplace. This might have many reasons, from which many might be
out of control of the CEO, such as the individuals involved in such a situation. As the upper
echelons theory proposes, there are many more individuals who might project their personal
political  beliefs  into a company,  thus reducing the potential  influence of the CEOs personal
ambitions.
Future research interested in the field of the effects of demographic characteristics of individual
managers might use this study as a starting point to evolve on the hypotheses made. The first
point in which this study could be extended is the expansion of the keywords used in the search.
The terms “gender  equality”,  “wage gap” and “glass  ceiling” were used,  because they were
assumed to be broad enough to record enough actions taken in favour of gender equality. Each
of those terms can be attributed to an aspect of gender equality in the workplace. The extension
of  this  study  to  cover  more  keywords  related  to  gender  equality  will  probably  return  more
results,  since the definition of gender equality in the workplace is also covering many more
aspects,  such  as  discrimination,  diversity,  education  and  many  more.  Finding  more  results
regarding gender equality will also increase the number of actions taken, thus increasing the
variance of the dataset.
Another point for future research would be to extend the time covered. This study covered the
years from 2009-2016, but researchers with more resources could take into consideration more
years. Also, expanding the research to more years would probably return more variance in the
dataset.
Furthermore, changing the search strategy could return better results for the future. Since this
study relied only on publicly available press statements from major US publications, the chance
is high that initiatives were missed. Local newspapers could also provide information on the
topics of interest when they are releasing news about local companies in the S&P 500. A further
approach  for  the  future  might  also  be  to  analyse  other  sources  than  newspapers,  such  as
financial  reports  of  the  firms  in  question,  or  go  through  the  websites  or  archives  of  those
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companies.  Even  interviewing  individuals  and  conducting  qualitative  research  might  return
more  variance  within  the  datasets  but  would  possibly  only  provide  information  on  recent
developments.
Finally, it is suggested that collecting more extensive public data on CEOs can be included in
future  research,  like  biographical  elements  such  as  family  background  (immigrant,  WASP,
place  where  he/she  was  raised,  race,  etc.),  educational  background  (elite  university,  public
college),  the  current  location  of  living  (e.g.  looking  at  voter  data  in  the  specific  area),
membership in public organisations with a particular purpose or interest and many others. 
This can also be extended to the TMT and the board of an organisation. Since a CEO is only a
single  person  and  not  representing  the  whole  decision-making  body  of  a  company,  more
individuals should be taken into consideration in future research. Also, decisions taken need to
be executed after their announcement, further increasing the role employees below the TMT
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